Wyoming Law Journal
Volume 6

Number 3

Article 4

December 2019

Constitutionality of Barbers' Price Fixing Act
Bob C. Sigler

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj

Recommended Citation
Bob C. Sigler, Constitutionality of Barbers' Price Fixing Act, 6 WYO. L.J. 246 (1952)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj/vol6/iss3/4

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Wyoming Law Journal by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

In the Laflin case, supra, involving the breeding of registered stock,
heifers were treated oppositely. In that case 34 cows ranging in ages from
9 years I month to 3 years, were allowed to be subject to capital gains but
68 females ranging from 1 year, 10 months to 1 year, were not so allowed.
This was partially because of the test that the animals "must not have been
held by the taxpayer in the ordinary course of his trade or business." The
Court considered these heifers to be part of Laflin's "money crop." The
other partial test favored by the Court was, "Admittedly none of the entire
sixty-eight had ever had a calf, and, with virtual certainty, a large number
of them were not pregnant and many of them, as their ages demonstrated,
had never been exposed to pregnancy."
Note, in the earlier case the heifers were young but their ages did
not govern the holding but in the later case the Court held the age of
many of the heifers demonstrated they could not have been breeding animals. The stress in both cases was upon the probability or possibility of
the heifers being bred. This is set forth in the judge's own words, "The
record in the Miller case satisfactorily established the definitive inclusion
of the heifers in the breeding herd. That in this[Laflin] case does not,
but rather points clearly to its negation. Their breeding to bulls (insofar
as it is indecisively shown) in this [Laflin] case is one .

.

. fact which has

led to opposite conclusions in the two cases."
A new round of litigation will be but the second round of the same
dance. The tune of the first was "not primarily held for sale" and that of
the second will be "held for breeding." There should be this difference,
whatever may be gained, formerly the taxpayer had the burden of proving
a negative issue; now he should have the burden of proving an affirmative
one.
W. A. COLE,

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BARBERS' PRICE FIXING ACT
Since 1939, the Legislature of the State of Wyoming has almost continuously been confronted with a barbers' price fixing bill; 1 however, the
bill has always failed to pass.
This article concerns itself primarily with the constitutionality of
such a proposed law.
Although legislation on this subject is not uniform, 2 for the most part
1.
2.

H.B. No. 64. 1939; H.B. No. 96, 1941; H.B. No. 81, 1943; H.B. No. 15, 1945; H.B.
No. 55, 1947; H.B. No. 64, 1949.
As representative of these statutes, see the following: Fla. Stat. 1949, sec. 476.27:
Code of Ia. 1950, secs. 369.1 to 369.5: 1947 Supp. to Gen. Stat. of Kan. 1935, sec.
65-1830; La. Act No. 48, 1936; Mich. Comp. Laws 1948, sec. 338.653; Minn. Stat. 1949,
secs. 186.01 to 186.08; 1939 Supp. to Mont. Rev. Codes 1935, sec. 3228.27; Neb. Rev.
Stat, 1943 secs 71-225 to 71-237; Nev. Comp; Laws Supp. 1931-1941, sec. 763: N.M.
Stat. 1941 secs. 51-1625 to 51-1638; N. Dak. Rev. Code 1943, ecs. 43-0416 and 43-0417:
Okla. Stat. 1941, sec. 59-102; S. Dak. Sem. Laws 1945, p. 117 (H.B. No. 157).

NOTES

these acts confer power on an administrative board, usually the board of
barber examiners, to approve minimum barber prices in the various
localities of the state, liased upon the cost of maintaining satisfactory sanitary conditions. Action to this end can be initiated by a certain percentage of the barbers in the locality, or the administrative board can
itself initiate the action. The board is given the power also to re-fix or
vary the minimum prices in the different localities as changing conditions
may warrent. Notice and hearing are provided for the barbers affected by
such administrative action. The act is generally preceded by a declaration
of policy by the legislature to the effect that unfair competition is prevailing which is detrimental to the health, safety, and welfare of the
general public, and that a fair minimum price will enure to the benefit
of the public by insuring adequate sanitary conditions, thereby protecting
the public health. Violation of the law is generally made a misdemeanor.
It is well established that professions or trades operating directly
on the person are thereby "affected with the public interest" and may be
regulated by the legislature under the police power, which enables the
legislature to make all needful rules and regulations for the health, safety,
and welfare of the people of the state.8 The police power is broad and
extensive and its regulations may reasonably limit the enjoyment of personal liberty including the right of making contracts. 4 But, happily, under
our form of government, the state is not everything; individual rights are
recognized as well as public welfare. Therefore, to obtain the proper constitutional balance, deprivation of individual rights must always be weighed
against the public welfare. 5 The courts, through the years, have developed
criteria to be applied in resolving this conflict. The means selected must
have a substantial relation to the end to be obtained, and the staute must
be reasonable. 6 In determining reasonableness, the courts generally consider four elements: (a) was the condition existing before the legislation
such as to require a remedy; (b) will the new rule provide an adequate
remedy; (c) will deprivation to individuals be sufficiently offset by the
benefit to public welfare; (d) are alternative methods available whereby
the same benefits can be obtained with less deprivation.7 Among the auxiliary rules which the courts have adopted for determining whether the
police power has been properly exercised are the following: (a) a declaration of the legislature that the industry is affected with a public interest
must be given great weight by the court and all reasonable doubt should
be resolved in its favor;8 however, it is always subject to inquiry by the
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

7 Am. Jur. 613.
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 18 S.Ct. 383, 42 L.Ed 780 (1898); Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 31 S.Ct. 259,
55 L.Ed. 328 (1911).
Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning Board, 134 Fla. 1, 183 So. 759, 119
A.L.R. 956 (1938).
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643, 3 Ann.Cas. 765
(1905).
See Note, "The Consideration of Facts in 'Due Process' Cases," 30 Col. L. Rev.
360, 362 (1930).
Board of Barber Examiners v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 182 So. 485 (1938).

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

courts whether the business is impressed with a public interest such as
will justify the regulation; 9 (b) the fact that other states have passed
similar legislation is entitled to some weight in determining whether the
means provided in a statute will tend to accomplish the valid and expressed
purpose of the legislature; 10 (c) prevention of destructive competition is
a permissible exercise of the police power; 1 (d) the reasonableness of the
exercise of police power by the state should be considered in the light of
12
current economic conditions.
It is clear that the services of a barber necessarily require personal
contact. It therefore involves the public health and safety, is a business
"affected with the public interest," and is subject to regulation under the
police power of the state. 18 It is undisputed that a state, in the exercise
of its police power, can require barbershops to be operated in a clean and
sanitary manner by competent operators.1 4 The question then is whether
the state can go further in the exercise of its police power and regulate
prices.
The Adkins case 1 5 decided in 1923, holding invalid an act of Congress
establishing minimum wages for women within the District of Columbia,
stood as the controlling guide in reference to price fixing legislation until
1934. The Nebbia case' 6 decided in 1934, approved a legislative act of the
state of New York establishing minimum prices for milk. It was there
said that there is no constitutional principle which bars the state from
correcting existing maladjustments by price legislation, if the industry is
subject to regulation in the public interest. Hence, in this case, we find
a recognition of the increasing economic complexities demanding more
governmental supervision and a tendency to change direction. And finally
in the West Coast Hotel Company case 17 decided in 1937, which upheld the
validity of a statute of the state of Washington establishing minimum
wages for women, the Supreme Court of the United States completely reversed the holding in the Adkins case. However, this latter holding does not
suggest that the right of a state to impose limitations on the power to
contract is unrestricted, or that the fundamental constitutional safeguards
9.
10.
1I.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 41 S.Ct. 458, 65 L. Ed. 865, 16 A.L.R. 165 (1921);
Becker v. State, 7 W.W. Harr., Del., 454, 185 A. 92, 93 (1936).
Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National Candy & Tobacco Co., 11 Cal. (2d).
634, 82 P.(2d) 3, 118 A.L.R. 486 (1938).
H.J. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct. 657, 93 L. Ed. 865
West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L. Ed. 703,
108 A.L.R. 1330 (1937).
Patton v. Bellingham, 179 Wash. 566, 38 P. (2d) 364, 98 A.L.R. 1076 (1934) ; Nation
v. Chism, 154 Okla. 50, 6 P. (2d) 766 (1931) ; Peters v. State, 56 Okla.Cr. 95, 34 P. (2d)
286 (1934) ; Grable v. Childers, 176 Okla. 360, 56 P. (2d) 357 (1936).
State ex rel. Garrison v. Reeve, 104 Fla. 196, 139 So. 817, 79 A.L.R. 1119 (1932);
Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 588, 110 S.E. 726, 20 A.L.R. 1105 (1922); Moler v.
Whisman, 243 Mo. 571, 147 S.W. 985, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 629 (1912).
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 43 S.Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785, 24 A.L.R.

1238 (1923).

Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R. 1469
(1934).
See note 12, supra.
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protecting the individual have otherwise been abandoned. It merely stands
for the proposition that the legislative department of a sovereign state
under its police power may regulate and fix prices for a trade or business
"affected with the public interest," if the legislation has a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety and welfare. In other words,
this decision in no way disturbed the "real and substantial relationship"
test.
Construing the constitutionality of barbers' price fixing statutes is
nothing novel. The courts have many times been put to the task. Price
fixing legislation, along the lines outlined supra, has been rejected in
Alabama, Iowa, Oregon, Utah, Indiana, Tennessee, Arizona, Arkansas,
California and New Jersey (by implication), and sustained in Oklahoma,
New Mexico, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Louisiana and Florida. All of these
authorities will hereafter be discussed.
The Alabama' s and Iowa' 9 cases cannot be credited with too much
weight because both holdings rested primarily upon the opinion of the
20
Adkins case.
The Oregon 2 ' and Utah 22 decisions also cannot be considered as controlling upon our primary problem since they held the act unconstitutional
as an improper delegation of legislative authority. In these states, price
fixing by the administrative board could be called into action only by
petition of a certain percentage of the barbers involved in a district,
whereas in Oklahoma and New Mexico, for example, such action can be
initiated either through petition by the barbers or upon the board's own
initiative. The Utah court approved the following quotation: "The
power conferred upon the majority is, in effect, the power to regulate the
affairs of an unwilling minority. This is legislative delegation in its most
obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an official
body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests
may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same bus23
iness."
The Indiana court in the Hollingsworth case, 24 decided in 1940, made
the same distinction as did the Oregon and Utah decisions, holding the
barbers' price fixing act invalid as an improper delegation of legisative
authority. The Legislature of Indiana seemingly cured that defect, in
1941, by putting the initiative for price setting in the board rather than
with the barbers, and providing a reasonable standard for rates. But in
18.

City of Mobile v. Rouse, 27 Ala. App. 344, 173 So. 254 (1937).

19.
20.

Duncan v. City of Des Moines, 222 Iowa 218, 268 N.W. 547 (1936).
enacted a barbers' price fixing act in 1939).
See note 15, supra.

21.
22.

La Forge v. Ellis, 175 Ore. 545, 154 P.(2d) 844 (1945).
Revne v. Trade Commission, 113 Utah 155, 192 P.(2d)

23.

Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310, 56 S.Ct. 855, 873, 80 L.Ed. 1188 (1936).

24.

Hollingsworth v. State Board of Examiners, 217 Ind. 373, 28 N.E.(2d) 64 (1940).

(1948).

(Iowa again

563, 3 A.L.R.(2d)

169
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construing the constitutionality of the new act in the Cloud case, 25 the
court said that any assumption from the Hollingsworth case that price
legislation for barbers could be validly enacted was only for the purpose
of demonstrating that the method used in the Act of 1939 was invalid.
The court held in the Cloud case that the Act of 1941 was unnecessary to
conserve the health of the general public and that the classification made
was unnatural. Accordingly, the new act was pronounced unconstitutional
The Tennessee decision2 6 was based upon about the same reasoning
as that employed in the Cloud case. The court recognized that the barbering trade could be controlled by police power, but ruled that licensing
-and making reasonable rules and regulations were sufficient to protect the
public health without the added feature of price fixing. Both the Indiana
and Tennessee decisions deemed that alternative methods were available
for attaining the desired end, and that price fixing entails a greater deprivation than other regulations which will accomplish the desired result:
therefore, the price fixing act was held to be invalid.
Arizona, 27 Arkansas, 28 and California2 9 have all held the barbers'
price fixing act to be unconstitutional on the principle that there is no
substantial relationship, either in logic or common sense, between public
health and prices charged for barber work. As the Arkansas case put it,
"... Such connection is visionary and not real.... ." The decisions of these
three states are directly contrary to the cases holding the barbers' price
fixing act to be constitutional.
By implication, it can be said that New Jersey8 0 falls into the same
category as Arizona, Arkansas, and California. New Jersey had a statute
making it unlawful to display any price list for barber services in or upon
any part of the premises of a barber shop. The court held that it was
undoubtedly the purpose of the legislature to further clean, efficient and
sanitary shops in the interest of health and safety of the people by stifling
competition and controlling prices; that prohibiting the display of price
lists was unreasonable and arbitrary, had no relation to the public health,
morals, or to the general welfare, and therefore that the statute was unconstitutional.
All of the cases upholding the constitutionality of the barbers' price
fixing act seemingly accept the legislative determination that there is a
substantial relation between minimum price regulations and sanitary
standards required of the barbers, since the board is in a position to determine what prices are necessary to enable barbers to maintain sanitary
standards.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

State Board of Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 220 Ind. 552, 44 N.E.(2d) 972 (1942).
State v. Greeson, 174 Tenn. 178, 124 S.W.(2d) 253 (1939).
Edwards v. State Board of Barber Examiners, 72 Ariz. 108, 231 P.(2d) 450 (1951).
Noble v. Davis, 204 Ark. 156, 161 S.W. (2d) 189 (1942).
Ex parte Kazas, 22 Cal.App. (2d) 161. 70 P. (2d) 962 (1937).
State v. Garrubo, 124 N.J.L. 19, 10 A.(2d) 635 (1940).

NOTES

The Oklahoma courts have five times held the barbers' price fixing
act constitutional and have answered almost every possible constitutional
objection in these five cases. They have held that a law may be general
and uniform in its nature and be within the recognized power of the
legislature, although it may not be universally applicable.3 1 An order of
the administrative board establishing minimum prices for barber work
does not contravene a provision of the state constitution prohibiting the
passage of a special or local law since the order is not a law, but merely a
"subordinate rule" promulgated under a policy laid down and standard
prescribed by the legislature.3 2 The legislature has the right to delegate
to designated instrumentalities certain powers of fact finding and regulation that it possesses, when it fixes the limits within which the powers are
to be exercised, and in doing so it does not amount to an unconstitutional
delegation.3 3 The sections of the act providing for fixing the minimum
prices which barbers may charge for their services are not so arbitrary,
discriminatory, or unreasonable in their general features, as to violate the
provisions of the state or federal constitutions regarding liberty, due process,
or freedom of contract.3 4 Also, the classification used in the act is valid
since it applies to all barbers similarly situated and, therefore, does not
35
violate the equal protection clause of the state of federal constitutions.
Other states sustaining the barbers' price fixing act have disposed of
the above mentioned objections in about the same manner as did Oklahoma,
but have also answered additional objections. The New Mexico court 36
holding the act constitutional said that in determining the constitutionality,
the courts will not examine the act to determine whether some abuses
may occur under the authority of the administrative board to regulate
prices in the interest of the public health ana welfare, but inquiry is directed to the question whether the statute, either on its face or under the
particular circumstances under consideration, is constitutional. It was
further said that the constitutional requirement that the legislature enact
laws to prevent trusts, monopolies, and combinations in restraint of trade
yields to a more important consideration of reasonably exercising the police
power over a business or profession having a vital relation to the public
health and welfare. It must here be observed that the New Mexico court
could just as well have answered this objection by merely saying that the act
in no way operates to promote trusts, monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade. This particular act is a far cry from an act regarding fair
trade prices where there is a set price for exactly the same article of merchandise and which concededly is a definite restraint to competition.3 7 It might
be said that the barbers' price fixing act still amounts to a set price for
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Herrin v. Arnold. 183 Okla. 392, 82 P. (2d) 977, 119 A.L.R. 1471
Tennyson v. State, 70 Okla.Cr. 415, 106 P(2d) 1114 (1940).
Jarvis v. State Board of Barber Examiners, 183 Okl. 527, 83 P.
Vandervort v. Keen, 184 Okla. 12.1, 85 P. (2d) 405 (1938).
Ex parte Herrin, 67 Okla.Cr. 104, 93 P. (2d) 21 (1939).
Arnold v. Board of Barber Examiners, 45 N.M. 57, 109 P. (2d)
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 71
1035 (1951).

(1938).
(2d) 560 (1938).
779 (1941).
S.Ct. 745, 95 L.Ed.
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the same article, but here it can not be said that the quality and quantity
received are the same. It could very easily be concluded that establishment of minimum prices for personal service does more to promote than
it does to stifle competition.
Both Minnesota 8s and Wisconsin 3 9 upheld the validity of the barbers'
price fixing act and held that the power to fix prices could as well be
lodged in the governor as in an administrative board specially set up for
that purpose. The Wisconsin court said that the legislature could, within
the limits of the constitution, deal with unfair trade practices and unfair
methods of competition, and the establishment of minimum prices for
barbers was within those limits.
Louisiana and Florida encountered much difficulty before finally holding the barbers' price fixing act constitutional and both situations are
worthy of mention. The Supreme Court of Louisiana 40 first held the act
unconstitutional but, upon rehearing, a divided court reversed itself and
held the act constitutional upon the authority of the changed position
which the United States Supreme Court had taken in the then recently
decided Nebbia case. 41 The Florida court was first confronted with such
an act in 1936.42 Using much of the reasoning expressed in the Adkins
case, 43 they held the act to be unconstitutional. But thereafter, the same
court upheld the validity of a price fixing statute concerning the laundry
business 4 4 and inferentially overruled its earlier and contrary holding in
the Ives case by saying: "There is no magic in the phrase, 'clothed with or
affected with a public interest'. Any business is affected by a public interest when it reaches such proportions that the interest of the public demands
that it be reasonably regulated to conserve the rights of the public and
when this point is reached, the liberty of contract must necessarily be
restricted." 4 5 Subsequently the Florida court did uphold the validity of
the barbers' price fixing act 46 but said the authority exercised is found not
in the interest of public health or general welfare but in a clause of the
Florida constitution, 47 not mentioned in the Ives case, granting the legislature power to enact laws designed for the correction of abuses and to
prevent unjust discrimination and excessive charges by persons engaged
in services of a public nature. However, the court did conclude that barber
services were of a public nature.
38.
39.

State v. McMasters, 204 Minn. 438, 283 N.W. 767 (1939).
State v. Fasekas, 223 Wis. 356. 269 N.W. 700 (1936). (Barbers' price fixing statute
since repealed in Wisconsin).

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Board of Barber Examiners v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 182 So. 485 (19.8).
See note 16, supra.
State ex rel. Fulton v. Ives, 123 Fla. 401, 167 So. 394 (1936).
See note 15, supra.
Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning Board, 134 Fla. 1, 183 So. 759, 119
A.L.R. 956 (1938); Florida Dry Cleaning Board v. Everglades Laundry, 137 Fla.
290, 188 So. 380 (1939).
Ibid at 183 So. 763.
McRae v. Robbins, 151 Fla. 109, 9 So. (2d) 284 (1942).
Art. 16, sec. 30.

45.
46.
47.

NOTES

How would the Supreme Court of Wyoming hold on the constitutionality of a barbers' price fixing act? This court has already held a city
ordinance regulating the hours of barber shops invalid as being unreasonable. 48 But this does not determine how the court would hold on price
fixing legislation. The majority of the cases which have considered the
validity of ordinances regulating the closing hours of barber shops have
held such regulations to be an unconstitutional invasion of the right to
earn a living, and consequentlly a denial of due process, having no reasonable relation to the proper exercise of the police power. 49 The Florida
court, after upholding the validity of the barbers' price fixing act, held
50
an ordinance invalid which restricted the business hours of a barber shop.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming in the case of State v. City of Slieridan,5 1
adopted the language of the Supreme Court of the United States 52 which
is as follows: "To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in
behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The Legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public
interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, br impose unsual and
unnecessary restrictions upon occupations." The adoption of the above
quotation would seem to indicate that Wyoming would follow the rule
expressed by the United States Supreme Court in the Weaver case 53 and
hold that if alternate methods are available for attaining a desired result,
the fact that one entails a greater deprivation than the other would be a
factor for consideration on the validity of the legislative choice. The
Wyoming court, however, definitely threw this rule out in the case of State
v. W. S. Buck Merc. Company,54 by holding that in considering the reasonableness of a regulation, the courts do not profess to substitute their judgment for that of the legislature on questions about which reasonable men
might differ, and, if the purpose of the law is to promote the public
welfare, the means adopted need not be the best. It is obvious then that
Wyoming would not declare the barbers' price fixing act unconstitutional
on the same grounds as did the courts of Indiana and Tennessee.
An analysis of the cases determining the constitutionality of the barbers' price fixing act makes it clear that the courts have promulgated many
rules but have been unable to establish any set pattern for following
those rules. Neither can it be said that there has been a recent tendency
to hold on way or the other on this problem.
48.

State ex rel. Newman v. City of Laramie et al, 40 Wyo. 74. 275 P. 106 (1929).

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

98 A.L.R. 1094.
City of Miami et al v. Shell's Super Store, Inc. -- Fla.---, 50 So. (2d) 883 (1951).
25 Wyo. 347, 170 P. 1 (1918).
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 14 S.Ct. 501, 38 L.Ed 385 (1894).
Weaver v. Palmer Bros Co., 270 U.S. 402, 46 S.Ct. 320, 70 L.Ed. 654 (1926).
38 Wyo. 47, 264 P. 1023, 57 A.L.R. 675 (1928).
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In conclusion, it can only be said that the problem seems to revolve
around the extent to which the courts will accept the legislative determination that prices of barbers bear a real and substantial relation to the
public health and welfare.
BOB C. SIGLER.

AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN A CRIMINAL ACTION
"The law imposes upon the state in criminal prosecution the burden
of proving the case set forth. in the indictment or information, in all its
material parts, beyond a reasonable doubt. . . ."I In the Anglo-American
system of jurisprudence, unlike the Continental system ,the parties themselves apportion the task of abducing evidence.2 They must apprise themselves of both the burden of proof and the burden of going forward with
the evidence. Thus in criminal cases the state, as heretofore mentioned,
must assume the former burden beyond a reasonable doubt if a conviction
is to stand; in civil cases the plaintiff assumes the same burden by a preponderance of the evidence.
Preponderance and reasonable doubt are of course not synonymous
terms-$ The distinction had its origin about the end of the 1700's and was
first applied in capital cases. 4 But where the accused in a criminal action
interposes an affirmative defense this distinction seems to become less
clear, according to some decisions.
The courts are not in agreement as to what in fact constitutes an
affirmative defense. The term has been defined as "some distinct substantive ground of defense to a criminal charge, not necessary to a prosecution
on which the indictment is founded," 5 or "facts wholly disconnected from
the body of the particular offense charged." 6 Such defense is matter not
7
covered by pleas of guilty, not guilty and former conviction or acquittal.
Alibi has been said to be an affirmative defense, 8 as well as the contrary. 9
The discord may stem in part from the fact that particular matter may
constitute an affirmative defense under some circumstances while not so
under others. An exception within a statute may be part of the offense,
in which instance the state will plead and prove it, or it may be an excuse
or justification providing an affirmative defense1 0 to be pleaded and proved
by defendant. An exception is part of the offense when it qualifies the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

20 A.J. 1111.
9 Wigmore, Evidence, 266.
Lovejoy v. State, 62 Ark. 478, 36 S.W. 575 (1896).
9 Wigmore, Evidence, 317.
Commonwealth v. McKie, 1 Gray (Mass.) 61, 61 Am. Dec. 410 (1854).
Commonwealth v. Gentry, 261 Ky. 564, 88 S.W. (2d) 273 (1935).
Ibid.
People v. Meisenhelter, 381 I11. 378, 45 N.E. (2d) 678 (1942) dictum.
State v. Hubbard, 351 Mo. 143, 171 S.W. (2d) 701 (1943).
State v. Stallman, -R.I.79 A.(2d) 611 (1951).

